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A rational power supply and pricing policy for pump irrigation could be
a  powerful tool for the indirect management of both groundwater and
energy use—if the two sectors can work together to take advantage of
this opportunity.
Consumption-linked pricing of power can improve efficiency of water and
power usage. However, metering, the solution advocated by the World
Bank and others, has the drawbacks of high transaction costs and strong
farmer resistance. Another solution, which has not received enough
attention, is a transformed, rational flat-rate tariff, combined with
restrictions on power supply.
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Electricity subsidies for farmers are an expensive legacy of past development policies. The result is overuse of both energy
and water in groundwater-irrigated agriculture—threatening the financial viability of the power sector and the future of
the groundwater resource itself, along with the livelihoods of the millions who depend on it.
The most popular solution is the metered tariff, promoted by international donors and many of India’s state governments.
But metering is the ideal solution only if the cost of metering and billing 14 million scattered, small users in India, Pakistan
and Bangladesh is ignored. Easier, more feasible and more beneficial in the short run in many parts of South Asia would be
the use of a rational flat tariff, which avoids the transaction costs and strong farmer opposition associated with metering.
The flat-tariff option has been ignored because, in its current incarnation, it has proved a complete failure. However,
combined with intelligent power supply rationing, it is a logical, viable alternative which could cut wasteful groundwater
use by 12-18 km3 per year in Western and Peninsular India alone.
The approach would involve (1) gradually raising tariffs to cut power utility losses; (2) supplying farms with fewer hours of
power per year, but ensuring a quality power supply during periods of moisture stress; and (3) metering at the feeder level
to measure and monitor farm power use, to allow good management.
This issue of Water Policy Briefing is based on research presented in: Energy-Irrigation Nexus in South Asia: Improving Groundwater
Conservation and Power Sector Viability (IWMI Research Report 70) by Tushaar Shah, Christopher Scott, Avinash Kishore, Abhishek
Sharma. The full text of this report is available at www.iwmi.org/pubs. IWMI’s research on the energy-irrigation nexus was carried out
with support from USAID’s Water-Energy Nexus Activity (WENEXA) and the Sir Ratan Tata Trust.
Metering may not be the answer
The key reason for power utility losses is
commonly thought to be the flat tariff, which is based
on pump capacity rather than metered consumption
of power. In mainstream thinking, metering is the
only solution. But farm-level metering was used all
over South Asia until the 1970s. Due to the huge
logistical difficulties and transaction costs involved,
this approach was abandoned in favor of the flat tariff.
Since no radical new solutions to these problems have
been found, there is little hope that metering will
succeed if reintroduced in India. Reintroduction of
farm-level metering in Pakistan in 1999 has benefited
neither farmers nor power utilities, and power theft
and meter-tampering are rife.
Two alternative ‘business philosophies’
The metered and flat-tariff regimes are not simply
alternative pricing policies—they are completely
different business philosophies. Using a metered tariff,
a power utility can confidently recoup its costs and
supply customers with as much power as they want,
when they want it. The flat tariff, by contrast, allows
power utilities to use sophisticated management to
provide a high-quality, but carefully rationed, power
supply and yet remain viable.
The flat tariff currently used is ‘degenerate’, because
it does not involve strict controls on supply. Paying a
flat rate for an almost unlimited supply encourages
consumers to maximize consumption, often
wastefully—as has happened in pump irrigation. As a
result, the reliability and quality of the power supply
has been sacrificed—severely threatening farmers’
crops at the height of the dry season.
A short-run solution: the rational
flat tariff
So, the key to making a flat tariff work is supply
rationing. For example, Gujarat does not need to supply
3,000 hours of farm power per year. It can make its
farmers happy (and cut its losses) by supplying only
1,200 hours, provided those 1,200 hours are made
available when most needed (Box 1). Gradual tariff
increases would be necessary, but subsidies should not
be removed completely—that would be political
suicide, given the farming community’s often violent
1 November, 2003opposition to attempts to
rationalize energy prices.
Farmers would benefit
greatly, although these gains
would need to be
guaranteed by the utilities,
and communicated clearly
to farmers (Box 2). Power
utilities would also
benefit—fewer hours of







In South Asia, the fortunes of the groundwater and
energy economies are closely tied. Little can be done in
the groundwater economy that will not affect the energy
economy. Plus, attempts to make the energy economy
viable (by raising the current flat tariff or cutting
subsidies) have been blocked by farmers, who are an
extremely important vote-bank.
Box 1. Transforming the flat power tariff:
from dysfunctional to functional
• Restrict the annual supply of farm power—but schedule
that supply so that power is available when farmers need it
most. The supply pattern necessary can be deduced by
studying farmers with rational pumping behavior—e.g., die-
sel-pump owners, who pay real prices for their power. This
supply management is the key element in the philosophy
behind a functional flat-rate tariff.
• Increase the tariff, though gradually and regularly—to-
wards covering the real cost of the electricity supply.
• Keep the power subsidy, but make it explicit—specify the
total amount the government will spend on subsidizing
power at the start of each year, then calculate the number
of hours of farm power this sum will buy from the power
utility at the flat-tariff rate (taking into account the lower
cost of off-peak supply).
• Use more off-peak power—increase the percentage of
power supplied to the farm sector during off-peak hours
(currently around 50%), and factor this into the calculation
of the number of hours provided by the subsidy.
The outcome is that a farmer in Gujarat, for
example, with a 5-horsepower (hp) pump pays only Rs
2,500 (US$51) per year for electricity, while in two of
India’s states (Indian Punjab and Tamilnadu) farmers
receive up to 14 hours of power per day free. Electricity
board losses in India alone are estimated to stand at Rs
26,000 crores (US$5.3 billion) per year. What’s more,
these losses are growing at 26% per year.
But do subsidies really encourage overuse of power
and groundwater? A recent IWMI survey showed
clearly that farmers accessing greatly subsidized
electricity supplies run their pumps for between 40%
and 250% longer than those who must buy diesel at
market rates to run their pumps (Fig. 1).
The case for indirect management
To halt the unsustainable use of groundwater,
decision makers commonly use the direct
management approach—involving tools such as laws,
water pricing policies and reform of property/water
rights. This has worked in some developed countries,
in countries with a relatively small number of large
pumpers, and in countries in which the proportion of
the population dependent on groundwater-irrigated
agriculture is small. But, even these countries have
found it difficult to remove agricultural energy
subsidies and stop overdraft completely.
In South Asia (in particular in India, Pakistan, Nepal
and Bangladesh) direct management is all the more
Flat-rate electricity tariffs induce farmers to pump more. Electric-pump owners pump groundwater for more
hours per year than diesel-pump owners, according to an IWMI survey of 2,234 tubewell irrigators across India
and Bangladesh conducted in late 2002. Cutting the number of hours of electricity supplied annually would
‘close the gap’ between electric and diesel pump use, and so cut ‘waste’ of power and water.
Source: IWMI Research Report 70
Figure 1. Comparison of annual hours of pump operation, electric (flat tariff) and
diesel pumpsets
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users scattered over large rural areas pose huge
logistical problems. Second, bodies regulating
groundwater use are often ill-equipped, inexperienced,
and have few field staff. Third, agriculture in these
developing countries is extremely important, so direct
management is particularly ‘painful’ as many people
rely on groundwater for their incomes and livelihoods.
The power sector’s proposed solution:
metering
As a method for indirect management of
groundwater use, there are strong theoretical
arguments in favor of the metered electricity tariff.
Farmers would learn the real cost of power and water
and be forced to economize on their use. Plus, the
power utilities would gain valuable information on
actual power usages (essential for efficient
management and cutting commercial losses).
Transaction costs would be huge
However, metering may not be feasible. In India
alone, the direct costs of installing, maintaining and
operating 14 million scattered rural meters (plus
meter-reading, billing and collecting charges) are
massive. A 2002 World Bank estimate for one small
state (Haryana) was US$30 million in capital costs and
US$2.2 million each subsequent year. This did not
include the indirect, far larger, costs of containing
pilferage, meter-tampering, and under-reading/under-
billing by meter readers in collusion with farmers.
Even now, logistical problems mean that utilities are
not able to collect the full billed amount from metered
customers in the industrial and domestic sectors.
Minimum charges, or estimates based on past
consumption, are often used instead.
Violent farmer opposition
Farmers are against metering—it will mean the
end of their power subsidy. Plus, many farmers
suspect that, once it is underway, state electricity
boards will introduce extra new charges. Memories of
corrupt meter readers in the 1980s (at the end of
which Gujarat abandoned meters) are also still fresh
in farmers’ minds.
This explains why there are not many takers for
new metering schemes, despite the extremely large
incentives state governments have provided. These
include very low tariffs—Rs 0.20-0.70/kWh
(US$0.004-0.014/kWh) against the actual cost of
supply of Rs 2.00-3.80/kWh (US$0.04-0.08/
kWh)—and even free drip-irrigation systems as in
Gujarat. In 2002, IWMI researchers interviewed
188 electric-pump owners, in 3 states, about pump
usage. They found that if the farmers in Haryana
and Indian Punjab accepted metering, along with
the low-tariff incentives, they would spend Rs
2,530 and Rs 6,805 less (US$52 and US$139,
respectively) per year on power. In effect, this is the
price they are willing to pay to avoid the ‘hassle’
and expected future costs of metering.
Box 2. To overcome farmer resistance to
rationed power supply:
• Enhance the predictability and certainty of supply—an-
nounce the annual schedule for power supply (tuned to
match the demand pattern of farmers) and stick to it.
• Improve the quality of supply—supply power at full volt-
age and frequency, thus minimizing damage to motors and
downtime of transformers.
• Match supply with peak periods of moisture stress—
guarantee farmers the power they need to pump during
the 6-8 weeks a year of critical moisture stress.
• Invest in upkeep of farm-supply infrastructure—pass on
to farmers the benefits of the additional revenue gained,
by ensuring they receive a reliable power supply.
Making a power subsidy explicit is vital to effective management of
the nexus . Presently, state governments provide a certain number of
hours of electricity per day, but don’t know the cost of that subsidy—
which depends upon how many farmers pump during those hours, and
for how long.
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North China provides a good example of a
successful metering system. Farmers benefit from a
modernized, rehabilitated supply infrastructure and
are prepared to pay a high price for a good quality
power supply and support/maintenance services. A
‘village electrician’, who receives a wage and incentive
payments, ensures that all power used at the level of
the village transformer is paid for. But, unlike much of
South Asia, agricultural productivity is high in China,
so the cost of electricity is low in relation to the value
of agricultural output and farmers’ incomes. Also,
there are strong authority structures, in particular the
Village Party Leader, which avoid the problem of
corruption at the village level.
In South Asia, metering could work in agriculturally
dynamic states (e.g., Punjab and Haryana) with high
agricultural productivity and a high (and growing) use
of electricity outside agriculture. However, micro-
entrepreneurs should be used to retail the power, to
meter individuals’ power consumption and to collect
revenue, as privatized meter reading and billing have
already cut commercial losses in Delhi.
Metering may not save water
Although unsubsidized metered charges could
make power utilities viable, water use would not
necessarily be cut. There is a growing body of evidence
that agricultural water demand is inelastic relative to
pumping costs, and that conservation measures are a
reaction to resource scarcity rather than high prices.
Indeed, the pockets of India where drip irrigation is
spreading rapidly are areas where water and/or power
is scarce rather than costly.
The rational flat tariff: conserving
groundwater and cutting power losses
The second method for indirect management of
groundwater—and the one likely to be most
successful—is the rational flat tariff. Flat-rate pricing
is a recognized business philosophy, often used when
an important objective is reducing the transaction
costs of doing business.
Successful examples span the commercial world. In
India, for example, a flat rate is charged by the telecom
department for the first 250 phone calls made. Many
customers thus try to keep their calls within this limit,
and the company’s billing costs are cut. The system is
also used for canal irrigation around the world—it is
not possible to measure and charge for individual
usage when a 5,000-ha command may contain 6,000-
8,000 customers.
Flat-rate electricity pricing in agriculture does not
carry the logistical problems and large transaction
costs metering does. And, if key points are considered
when implementing the system (Box 2), it should not
provoke farmer opposition.
Farmers like the flat tariff because it is
simple and transparent (unlike
metering). Plus, it is a subsidy that
reaches them directly.
Farmers like the flat tariff because it is simple and
transparent (unlike metering). Plus, it is a subsidy that
reaches them directly, without being ‘creamed off’ by
intermediaries (as other subsidies can be). When
transforming the current dysfunctional flat-rate tariff,
policymakers should appreciate this; indeed, all of the
measures in Box 1 (and expanded upon below) need to
be included in one policy.
Making the power subsidy explicit
Keeping the power subsidy is important, not just for
the political life of state governments, but to keep
farmers farming. If charging farmers realistic energy
A farmer operating a 10 hp tubewell in Tamilnadu, where farmers are
supplied with 14 hours of 3-phase power throughout the year, can
theoretically receive a subsidy of Rs. 45000/year (app. US$1,000) in free
power (operating his pump 3000 hours/at Rs 2/kWh).
Water Policy Briefing 4prices means bankrupting them, all the progress made
since the 1950s in groundwater-based livelihood
creation would be lost.
Making a power subsidy explicit is vital to effective
management of the nexus . Presently, state governments
provide a certain number of hours of electricity per day,
but don’t know the cost of that subsidy—which depends
upon how many farmers pump during those hours, and
for how long. For example, a farmer in Tamilnadu (where
farm electricity is free) may use between 0 and 14 hours
of power/day. If the real cost of power is taken to be Rs 2/
kWh (US$0.04/kWh), then subsidizing that one farmer
could cost the state anywhere between Rs 0 and 75,000
(US$1,531) per year. Reducing the number of total hours
supplied to a set level and increasing power supply when
irrigation is needed most would greatly reduce this
uncertainty, as well as the cost of the subsidy.
Raising the flat tariff: gradually and regularly
In most states, tariffs have not been changed for
10-15 years, though generation and distribution costs
have soared. Inevitably, infrastructure has decayed and
supply quality has dropped. Raising the flat tariff is,
unfortunately, unavoidable—to halt this decline and
stop large rural areas losing their electricity supply
completely (as has happened in eastern India).
The difference between farmers using
electric and diesel pumps gives some
indication of the ‘waste’ of energy and
groundwater the current ‘degenerate’ flat-
tariff regime encourages.
But, frustrated by farmer resistance to metering, many
Indian state electricity boards are threatening four-to-
five-fold increases in the current flat tariff. Gujarat’s board
intends to hit farmers with a 350% price-hike, raising the
annual charge from Rs 500/hp (US$10.41/hp; unchanged
since 1989) to Rs 1,700/hp (US$35.39/hp). Eventually this
will become Rs 2,100/hp (US$43.72/hp), to comply with
demands from the Gujarat Electricity Regulatory
Commission. However, if the state does this, the farmers
may well unseat the government.
A regular 10-15% annual increase, would be easier for
farmers to cope with, and thus more likely to be
accepted. Combined with the other measures outlined
here, this would allow farmers to see improved quality
and reliability of supply as the benefits of the price rise.
Finally, the price-hikes
planned in India are
designed to cover the cost of
supplying power for the high
number of hours that
politicians have promised
farmers. These costs would
be much lower if a lower




the crux of the matter
Farmers who use diesel-
powered pumps pay real/
market costs for their power
supply. So, they are unlikely
to waste money pumping
water they don’t need. Their
behavior is rational and
Providing 12 plus hours of daily power supply to the farm sector throughout the year leads to wasteful use of
power and water under a flat tariff regime. A more sustainable option would be to match power supply to
farmer need—using the pumping patterns of diesel pump owners as a guide.
Figure 2 is a schematic diagram which is based on the evidence of Figure 1.
Source: IWMI Research Report 70
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5  November,  2003based on economics, rather than on maximizing benefits
from a free or artificially low-cost resource. They are the
benchmark against which ‘excess’ use of power by
electric tubewell owners can be measured.
Each month, electric pumps are used for a greater
number of hours than diesel pumps (Fig. 2). The
difference between farmers using electric and diesel
pumps gives some indication of the ‘waste’ of energy and
groundwater the current ‘degenerate’ flat-tariff regime
encourages. Certainly there is scope for cutting the hours
of power supplied to farmers under a rational flat tariff,
and diesel-pump usage can also be used to guide the
annual scheduling of a restricted electricity supply, by
showing when farmers need water most.
Irrigators perceive a good quality service to be the
provision of power of a uniform voltage and frequency
when their crops face critical moisture stress. Therefore,
with intelligent management of power supply, it is
possible to satisfy irrigation power demand by ensuring
18-20 hours of power a day for 40-50 key moisture-stress
days in the kharif and rabi seasons (around 2 and 5
weeks respectively). Some power (e.g., 1-2 hours/day)
would also be made available on other days of the year.
Through this regime, supply could be restricted to
1,200 hours/year. This would mean that a typical pump (5
hp, lifting 25 m3 of water/hour) could provide its owner
with 30,000 m3 of water—sufficient for most small
farmers in the region. Such ‘water entitlement’ compares
favorably with that in a canal irrigation system.
Use of off-peak power would further reduce the cost
of electricity—by around 25% if all power was off-
peak. And, as many farmers irrigate at night, this would
not affect their farming practices.
So, the most viable and practical solution to the
current crisis involves raising the flat tariff to Rs 900
(US$18.37) (and eventually to Rs 1,200 [US$24.49]),
using 100% off-peak electricity, and restricting
annual supply of farm power to 1,000-1,200 hours/
year, rather than the uneconomical 3,500-5,000 hours/
year currently provided. The challenge for power
utilities would be to match the timing of power supply
to the  periods when crops need water most. This
would vary a great deal as crops grown vary across
and even within regions.
The benefits of the rational flat tariff
If well managed, such a strategy could cut wasteful
use of groundwater by 12-18 km3 of water/year in
western and peninsular India alone, reducing power
use in groundwater extraction by some 2-3 billion kWh
of power—valued at Rs 4,000-6,000 crores/year
(US$0.8 billion-1.2 billion/year). Plus, it could actually
improve farmer satisfaction with the power industry.
The strategy would also make groundwater and
power use more sustainable (compared with the
present regime or a metered tariff) by placing an
effective check on total use of both resources, and
thereby cutting blatant overuse. For example, farmers
who use automatic switches to maximize the amount
of groundwater they pump could not indulge in such
waste if they only received a rationed quota of good-
quality power on a pre-announced schedule.
A rational flat tariff combined with supply
management could cut wasteful use of
groundwater by 12-18 km3 of water/year
in western and peninsular India alone.
Providing power for 1-2 hours/day outside the main
irrigation seasons will encourage farmers to build
small on-farm storage tanks, to meet their water needs.
And, as the flat tariff is greater for pumps with higher
horsepower ratings, raising the tariff would encourage
farmers to purchase and use smaller capacity pumps to
irrigate smaller areas—thus reducing overdraft in
regions where depletion is rampant.
Some borewell owning farmers lift water during the night to fill an
open well using an automatic switch, and then lift water during the
day from the open well to irrigate their fields. Charging farmers a
metered rate of Rs 2/kWh would certainly put an end to this type of
practice; but so would  cutting the hours of supply and following power
a pre-announced schedule.
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